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ABSTRACT—The use of mercenaries during the American Revolution 
should inform the debate over the regulation of private military firms 
(PMFs) today. This Comment examines the historical use of mercenaries to 
demonstrate that a standing army, in the experience and understanding of 
the Framers, included both enlisted citizens and private enterprises who 
performed a wide range of essential military functions. It further argues that 
PMFs as they currently function in Iraq and Afghanistan fall squarely 
within the Framers’ broad conception of a standing army. The debates 
about national defense following the American Revolution show that the 
Framers accepted a standing army in the new nation solely on the condition 
that it be regulated and controlled by Congress. However, PMFs are 
currently governed as civilians by the terms of their contracts with the 
Executive Branch. This arrangement has led to a number of serious 
problems, including widespread waste and fraud resulting from deficient 
oversight, lack of accountability for brutal human rights violations, and 
distortion of the democratic decisionmaking process. This Comment argues 
that treating PMFs as civilians for the purposes of regulation is misguided, 
both as a constitutional and practical matter. Congress must exert control 
over PMFs using the same system that governs the military, in accordance 
with the separation of powers over national defense established at the 
framing. 
 
AUTHOR—J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2012; 
B.A., Tulane University, 2000. I would like to thank Professor Joseph 
Margulies for his advice and feedback in developing this project, as well as 
the members of the orthwestern University Law Review for their editorial 





N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 318 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 318 
I. MILITARY PRACTICE AT THE TIME OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION...................... 321 
A. Background: Early European Experience with Mercenaries ...................... 321 
B. Armies in the American Revolution ............................................................. 323 
C. The Debates About Standing Armies in America ........................................ 326 
D. Congress’s Authority over the Armed Forces ............................................. 331 
II. THE MODERN PRIVATE MILITARY FIRM ............................................................... 332 
A. Role in Contemporary American Foreign Policy ........................................ 332 
B. ot Quite Civilians, ot Quite Soldiers ...................................................... 335 
C. Flaws in the Current System ....................................................................... 339 
III. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM ....................................................................................... 346 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 349 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 31, 2010, President Obama announced the end of combat 
operations in Iraq.1 In the eighteen months preceding the announcement, 
nearly 100,000 troops returned home.2 But the withdrawal of troops did not 
necessarily mean a reduction in U.S. military presence.3 A surge of private 
military firms (PMFs)4 arrived in Iraq as U.S. troops departed.5 The United 
States would maintain its military hegemony in Iraq beyond the end of 
combat operations, but it would exercise authority through the use of 
private military companies rather than American troops. 
A deep ambivalence has accompanied the use of PMFs in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.6 As a presidential candidate in February 2008, Hillary Clinton 
sharply criticized military contractors, referring to them as mercenaries and 
sponsoring legislation to ban them.7 As Secretary of State in July 2010, 
 
1
  Helene Cooper & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Declares an End to Iraq Combat Mission, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 1, 2010, at A1. 
2
  See Alexander Cockburn, o, the Empire Doesn’t Always Win, NATION, Aug. 30/Sept. 6, 2010, at 
9, 9. 
3
  See id. 
4
  PMFs are also commonly called PMCs (private military companies). PSC (private security 
company) refers to the subset of PMFs that provide protective services. 
5
  See Jeremy Scahill, Iraq Withdrawal? Obama and Clinton Expanding US Paramilitary Force in 
Iraq, NATION (July 22, 2010, 10:59 AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/37877/iraq-withdrawal-
obama-and-clinton-expanding-us-paramilitary-force-iraq. 
6
  See, e.g., Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges 
Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989, 995, 1004 (2005) (calling the 
prospect of unaccountable private military contractors both “disturbing” and “inconsistent with growing 
demands for compliance with human rights globally,” but acknowledging that “[i]mmediate benefits are 
clear”). 
7
  Scahill, supra note 5. 
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however, in the midst of the troop withdrawal from Iraq, she asked 
Congress to approve funding to double the number of PMFs working in 
Iraq under the authority of the State Department.8 
Condemning the use of PMFs when politically expedient and then 
employing them when convenient is not a new phenomenon in American 
history. One of the complaints lodged against King George in the 
Declaration of Independence was that “[h]e is at this time transporting large 
Armies of foreign Mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation 
and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty & perfidy 
scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the 
Head of a civilized nation.”9 Nevertheless, during the Revolution, American 
military leaders actively sought the aid of mercenaries to support their 
fledgling army of enlisted men.10 It would have been odd for them to do 
otherwise: the use of mercenaries was the norm in European warfare at that 
time.11 
The use of mercenaries during the American Revolution should inform 
the debate over the regulation of PMFs today. This Comment examines the 
historical use of mercenaries to demonstrate that a standing army, in the 
experience and understanding of the Framers, included both enlisted 
citizens and private enterprises who performed a wide range of essential 
military functions. It further argues that PMFs as they currently function in 
Iraq and Afghanistan fall squarely within the Framers’ broad conception of 
a standing army. The debates about national defense following the 
Revolution show that the Framers accepted a standing army in the new 
nation solely on the condition that it be regulated and controlled by 
Congress. If PMFs fall within the Framers’ conception of a standing army, 
then Congress has a responsibility under the Constitution to regulate them 
as part of the military.12 
 
8
  Id. 
9
  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 27 (U.S. 1776). 
10
  See DANIEL MARSTON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: 1774–1783, at 20 (2002). For example, the 
American army during the Revolution employed European officers with expertise in military 
technology, paid Native Americans to fight with them against the British, and sometimes even competed 
directly with King George for the services of the Hessian mercenaries that the authors of the Declaration 
so vehemently deplored. See infra Part I.B.2. 
11
  See P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 
28–34 (updated ed. 2008). By the seventeenth century, “European armies . . . often were simple 
amalgamations of hired mercenary companies, all with their own specialties.” Id. at 28. 
12
  The word “mercenary” is imbued with negative connotations, and its meaning varies substantially 
according to context. Because the comparison between mercenaries at the time of the Revolution and 
PMFs today is central to the argument of this Comment, it may be helpful to briefly address the 
ambiguity of the term and distinguish between its various meanings. In the context of historical 
scholarship, the broad concept of mercenary encompasses many types of military professionals. See, 
e.g., Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private 
Military Companies, 176 MIL. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2003) (explaining that mercenaries could be “lone 
adventurer[s]” who fought for the highest bidder, elite guards of heads of state, and “free companies” of 
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PMFs are currently governed as civilians by the terms of their contracts 
with the Executive Branch.13 This arrangement has led to a number of 
serious problems, including widespread waste and fraud as a result of 
deficient oversight, lack of accountability for brutal human rights 
violations, and distortion of the democratic decisionmaking process.14 This 
Comment argues that treating PMFs as civilians for the purposes of 
regulation is misguided, both as a constitutional and as a practical matter. 
Congress must exert control over PMFs using the same system that governs 
the military, in accordance with the separation of powers over national 
defense established at the framing. 
Part I examines the use of mercenaries in European militaries and the 
Continental Army during the American Revolution, and then examines how 
the military experience and political background of the Framers shaped the 
debates that led to the standing army provisions of the Constitution. Part II 
analyzes the current system of military contracting and some of the 
problems associated with that system. Part III argues that the most effective 
way to address problems in the current system involves bringing contractors 
under congressional military regulation. This Comment suggests regulatory 
changes consisting of three major components: (1) integration of PMFs into 
the military chain of command, (2) extension of the jurisdiction of courts 
martial over PMFs, and (3) strengthening of oversight by improving 
 
private armies who sold their services to feudal lords). In modern international law, the term mercenary 
has a narrowly defined meaning and its application to a particular group has specific legal consequences. 
See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 47, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 25. Modern 
PMFs are adamant that the Geneva Convention definition does not apply to them, and many scholars 
agree. See infra note 220 and accompanying text.  
However, it is not just the legal implications of the term that trouble PMFs. The word mercenary has 
long carried a derogatory connotation. Even at the time of the Constitution’s framing, when mercenaries 
were widely employed, the word mercenary was often used to mean untrustworthy, self-serving, or 
motivated solely by financial gain. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 397 
(Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott, eds. 1920) (“If men will not serve in the Legislature without a 
prospect of such offices, our situation is deplorable indeed. If our best Citizens are actuated by such 
mercenary views, we had better chuse a single despot at once.”). In this derogatory context, the term is 
often merely a tool of political rhetoric, and it carries no specific legal or historical meaning. See SARAH 
PERCY, MERCENARIES: THE HISTORY OF A NORM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 50–51 (2007) (“The 
word mercenary has evolved into a pejorative term used to denote a disliked soldier. The proscription 
against mercenary use is so strong that the word mercenary itself has become a powerful political 
tool . . . .”). For the purposes of this Comment, the comparison of modern PMFs to their seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century European counterparts—whom historians call mercenaries—does not imply that 
PMFs are mercenaries as defined by current international law. Neither does this Comment use the word 
in its derogatory sense. Instead, it seeks to show that the Framers understood standing armies to include 
a number of different private military enterprises as well as enlisted citizen soldiers. 
13
  See Deborah Avant, Mercenaries, FOREIGN POL’Y, July–Aug. 2004, at 20, 22 (“In the United 
States . . . the Federal Acquisition Regulations and additional Department of Defense rules govern 
contracts with private [military] firms.”). 
14
  See infra Part II.C. 
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Congress’s access to information about PMFs. All three suggestions can be 
accomplished either through legislation or control over the military budget. 
The historical analysis in this Comment establishes that Congress has 
the power, under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution,15 to regulate PMFs 
as part of the military. Thus far, Congress has failed to exercise this power. 
Congress’s failure represents an abdication of its proper role in the 
constitutional system of separation of powers over the military. As the 
Framers well understood, the “parchment barriers” in the constitutional text 
are insufficient to maintain the correct balance of power among the 
branches of the federal government.16 Rather, each branch must protect its 
own institutional authority.17 Congress must exert control over PMFs in 
order to reestablish the proper separation of powers over the military. 
I. MILITARY PRACTICE AT THE TIME OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
Part I reviews the use of mercenaries in medieval and early modern 
Europe to establish the historical context for their use during the American 
Revolution. Then it examines the British and American practice of 
employing mercenaries during the Revolution and shows how this practice 
shaped political debate on both sides of the Atlantic. 
A. Background: Early European Experience with Mercenaries 
The use of mercenaries in Europe grew out of shortcomings in the 
medieval feudal system.18 In the feudal system, each social class owed 
military service to the class above it for a short period each year, leaving 
rulers with unspecialized forces on call for a limited time.19 It became 
common for lords to pay for the services of private military companies 
composed of individuals who specialized in a particular skill.20 Over time, 
these private military companies developed into well-organized and 
lucrative businesses. For example, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, 
professional infantry units and royal guards in Switzerland became 
 
15
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To raise and support Armies . . . .”). 
16
  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 305 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“Will it be 
sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these departments in the constitution of the 
government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power? . . . But 
experience assures us that the efficacy of the provision has been greatly overrated . . . .”). 
17
  See id. NO. 51, at 318 (James Madison) (“In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and 
distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all 
hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will 
of its own . . . .”); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (“[O]nly Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.”). 
18
  See SINGER, supra note 11, at 22. 
19
  See id. 
20
  Id. Artillerymen, for instance, formed an international trade guild with its own patron saint and 
zealously guarded trade secrets. Id.  
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industries that operated on an international scale.21 Contemporaneously in 
Italy, the condottiere system (from condotta, meaning “contract”) 
formalized business relationships between mercenary captains and the cities 
that hired them for protection.22 
The rise of mercenary forces sometimes posed a grave danger to the 
social order, as when unemployed mercenaries ravaged the French 
countryside after the Hundred Years’ War demanding that towns and cities 
pay them protection money.23 To resolve the tension between the usefulness 
of mercenaries in times of war and the inherent danger they posed in times 
of peace, states began to bring them under control by subjecting them to 
legal restrictions and incorporating them into more permanent military 
institutions.24 Thus, in the fifteenth century, the Swiss government devised 
strict contracts for its mercenary companies, and Charles VII of France 
organized mercenaries into compagnies d’ordonnance, a “prototype 
standing army.”25 
The gradual professionalization of European militaries reached a peak 
during the Thirty Years’ War, which lasted from 1618 to 1648.26 In that 
conflict, which marked a “heyday for hired armies,”27 the majority of 
soldiers who fought and died were mercenaries.28 The Peace of Westphalia 
that ended the Thirty Years’ War marked the beginning of the long 
transition from the use of mercenaries to the use of national armies.29 That 
treaty solidified the emergence of nation-states with exclusive sovereignty 
over affairs within their borders.30 This new political reality provided the 
context in which standing armies, composed entirely of enlisted citizens, 
replaced private military enterprises as the new norm.31 
The phase-out of private military enterprises after the Thirty Years’ 
War was very gradual, however, and nations continued to employ 
mercenaries well into the nineteenth century.32 It was not until 1871, when 
 
21
  Id. at 27. 
22
  See PERCY, supra note 12, at 75. 
23
  Id. at 78. 
24
  See id. at 78–93. 
25
  Id. at 82–84. 
26
  Christopher H. Lytton, Blood for Hire: How the War in Iraq Has Reinvented the World’s Second 
Oldest Profession, 8 OR. REV. INT’L L. 307, 314 (2006). 
27
  Id. (quoting P.W. Singer, The Ultimate Entrepreneur, MIL. HIST. Q., Spring 2003, at 6, 8) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
28
  Id. at 314–15. 
29
  See SINGER, supra note 11, at 29. 
30
  Id. 
31
  See Janice E. Thomson, State Practices, International orms, and the Decline of Mercenarism, 
34 INT’L STUD. Q. 23, 43 (1990) (“Two factors were crucial to the decline of mercenarism and other 
forms of nonstate violence: the transformation of the state into the nation-state and the rise of the 
citizen.”). 
32
  See SINGER, supra note 11, at 32. 
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“Prussia’s victory in the Franco-Prussian War demonstrated the superiority 
of a citizen-army” over professional military companies, that every major 
state in Europe began relying on their own citizens for national defense.33 
The American Revolution, which began in April of 1775, occurred in the 
middle of this long period of transition. When the founding generation built 
the framework for a new nation, the emerging ideal of the citizen soldier 
was taking hold, but the paid mercenary remained a staple of armed 
conflict. 
B. Armies in the American Revolution 
1. Britain’s Use of Mercenaries.—When the American Revolution 
began in 1775, Britain did not have enough troops to defeat the American 
forces and maintain control over its worldwide empire.34 That year, the 
British Army stood at about 48,000 officers and men, distributed 
throughout North America, Ireland, Great Britain, Minorca, Gibraltar, 
Africa, and the West Indies.35 Eight thousand of these—far too few to 
contain the insurrection—were stationed in North America.36 Attempts to 
enlist more Englishmen into the regular army failed.37 The problem of 
insufficient troops intensified when France and Spain entered the conflict 
and sided with the colonies.38 
Under these circumstances, the decision to hire mercenaries was a 
natural British response.39 They hired roughly 10,000 Native Americans 
from the Iroquois and Algonquin nations to serve as scouts and raiders.40 
They also turned to the professional armies of the German principalities and 
 
33
  See Thomson, supra note 31, at 32. 
34
  See SINGER, supra note 11, at 33. 
35
  See MARSTON, supra note 10, at 17. 
36
  Id. 
37
  See PERCY, supra note 12, at 152. For example, in 1778 Britain added 1000 Englishmen to the 
ranks of the army by imposing a parish quota, but they deserted en masse at the first opportunity. Id. 
One historian offers a broad explanation for the lack of military enthusiasm: 
Modern nationalism not yet having appeared, and the emotions of Europe’s religious wars having 
burned themselves out, the European populations at large were divorced from interest in the 
political goals of their monarchs. . . . To have enlisted huge numbers of men into their armies 
would have been difficult, since most of their subjects were indifferent to the purposes of their 
wars.  
RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 19 (enlarged ed. 1984). More 
specifically, in the context of the American Revolution the British may have faced difficulties raising 
troops because the war against the colonies was controversial. See PERCY, supra note 12, at 153 (noting 
the Duke of Chandos’s observation that British troops were reluctant “to engage against their fellow-
citizens”). 
38
  See MARSTON, supra note 10, at 17. 
39
  See PERCY, supra note 12, at 149 (“By the time the American Revolution began, there was no 
question that Britain would send foreign troops as part of its army, because foreigners had always been 
used in the past.”). 
40
  See MARSTON, supra note 10, at 19. 
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ultimately hired nearly 30,000 German mercenaries.41 The decision to use 
mercenaries may have followed the prevailing norm, but it met with dissent 
from some English political leaders, who challenged the hiring of German 
troops on both moral and pragmatic grounds.42 This criticism reflects a 
broader trend: the emerging belief that citizen armies were superior to 
mercenaries.43 
The use of mercenaries against English subjects particularly disturbed 
critics.44 Such resistance had very deep roots in English history. As long ago 
as 1215, rebellious barons forced King John to banish mercenary soldiers 
“who have come with horses and arms, to the kingdom’s hurt.”45 In the 
aftermath of the English Civil War, which lasted from 1642 to 1651, fear of 
standing armies prompted the revival of the militia system, a regime in 
which local citizen volunteers enforced domestic security.46 Consistent with 
the preference for local militias, the Bill of Rights that emerged from the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 forbid the “raising and keeping [of] a Standing 
Army within this Kingdome in time of Peace without Consent of 
Parlyament . . . .”47 There can be little doubt that the standing armies 
addressed in this document were widely understood to include mercenaries; 
the English army in Flanders in the 1690s was nearly half mercenary, and 
that number rose in the following decade.48 Generally, it appears that the 
British did not have a problem with mercenaries per se, but rather with the 
Crown’s use of mercenaries at home against English subjects. The 
preference for local militias over standing armies at home would inform the 
American constitutional debates a century later.49 
2. America’s Use of Mercenaries.—In 1775, most of Washington’s 
soldiers went home in December upon the expiration of their enlistments.50 
Washington reorganized the army on January 1, 1776, but not enough men 
 
41
  See SINGER, supra note 11, at 33. Because approximately two-thirds were from the Hesse-Kassel 
region, the German forces became known as “Hessians” by the Americans. Id. 
42
  See PERCY, supra note 12, at 152–55. For instance, some argued that mercenarism was akin to 
slavery; others pointed out that the presence of foreign troops would solidify American resistance. See 
id. 
43
  Id. at 149–52. 
44
  Id. at 153 (quoting Mr. Alderman Bull, who exhorted, “[L]et not the historian be obliged to say 
that the Russian and the German slave was hired to subdue the sons of Englishmen and of freedom” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
45
  A. E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 18, 48 (revised ed. 1998). 
46
  See Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the 
Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961, 968–970 (1975). 
47
  An Act Declareing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Setleing the Succession of the 
Crowne (Bill of Rights), 1688, 1 W. & M., c.2 (Eng.). 
48
  PERCY, supra note 12, at 149. 
49
  See infra Part I.C. 
50
  Holly A. Mayer, The Continental Army, in A COMPANION TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 308, 
309 (Jack P. Greene & J.R. Pole eds., paperback ed. 2004).  
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volunteered, and none of the regiments were at full strength for the 1776 
campaign.51 The personnel problem continued throughout the war,52 but 
Congress and the military command attempted to combat it in part by hiring 
mercenaries.53 
Although the number of paid foreign troops fighting for the Americans 
was always lower than the number of Hessian mercenaries on the British 
side, the Continental Army did employ foreign corps to ameliorate their 
manpower shortage.54 They also competed with the British for the services 
of the Native Americans and Hessians. For instance, Ethan Allen, the 
Colonel Commandant of the Vermont militias, sent a message to the 
Caughnawagas in Canada, urging them that the British king was in the 
wrong and offering to give them “Money Blankets Tomehawks Knives and 
Paint and the Like as much as you say” if the Caughnawagas would join 
Allen’s troops.55 After the Hessians arrived at Staten Island, Congress 
formed a committee to devise plans for encouraging them to defect to the 
American side56 and periodically distributed leaflets offering them land and 
livestock in exchange for their service.57 
In addition to facing a troop shortage, the continental army lacked 
expertise in key areas.58 The Americans addressed this problem by engaging 
the professional services of European military officers.59 According to one 
historian, this practice became so widespread that Congress “seemed to be 
dispensing commissions wholesale to foreign adventurers.”60 Washington 
felt obliged to remind Congress that a background of service in a foreign 
army was not a guarantee of competence, but he too recognized the army’s 
 
51
  Id. 
52
  Id. 
53
  See MARSTON, supra note 10, at 20. 
54
  See id. The foreign corps included “Pulaski’s Legion, Von Heer’s Provost Corps and Brigadier-
General Charles Tuffin Armand’s Independent Chasseurs.” Id. 
55
  BARBARA GRAYMONT, THE IROQUOIS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 68 (1972) (quoting a 
message from Ethan Allen of Vermont). 
56
  See CHARLES PATRICK NEIMEYER, AMERICA GOES TO WAR: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE 
CONTINENTAL ARMY 52 (1996). 
57
  EDWARD J. LOWELL, THE HESSIANS AND OTHER GERMAN AUXILIARIES OF GREAT BRITAIN IN 
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 286 (Heritage Books 2008). One 1778 proclamation promised “fifty acres 
of land to every soldier that will come over, and any captain who brings forty men with him shall 
receive eight hundred acres of woodland, four oxen, one bull, two cows, and four sows.” Id. 
58
  See WEIGLEY, supra note 37, at 64–65 (“Washington continued to lack officers sufficiently 
versed in combat tactics and experienced in the stress of combat to make the right decisions consistently 
and promptly . . . .”). 
59
  See id. 
60
  Id. at 65; see also Aram Bakshian, Foreign Adventurers in the American Revolution, 21 HIST. 
TODAY 187, 187 (1971) (noting the efforts of Silas Deane and Benjamin Franklin to recruit professional 
officers from Europe and describing the “swarms of adventurers of many nationalities [who] repaired to 
America uninvited, presenting themselves to a Congress that gradually grew weary of the seemingly 
endless supply of martial counts, barons, and marquises, many of them self-ennobled.”). 
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necessities.61 His engineering corps was adequate only because he hired 
foreign military professionals with the necessary expertise,62 and he 
received valuable help from foreign officials in a number of areas that were 
vital to the American campaign.63 With the help of contributions by foreign 
military professionals, by 1781 Washington’s forces became a small 
standing army based on the model of eighteenth-century European 
militaries.64 
Given both their own experience building the American army and their 
familiarity with European practice at the time of the Revolution, it is 
reasonable to infer that the Framers and other well-informed citizens 
understood that a standing army included a wide range of military 
professionals beyond the enlisted citizen. 
C. The Debates About Standing Armies in America 
The debates over the use of standing armies in America during the 
Revolution and its aftermath reveal a deep tension between the value of 
liberty and the demands of security.65 The terms of the debate drew heavily 
on the competing views of radical and moderate Whigs in seventeenth-
 
61
  See WEIGLEY, supra note 37, at 65. 
62
  Id. at 70. For example, Polish engineer Tadeusz Kosciuszko contributed to the defensive works at 
Saratoga, and French military engineers led by Louis Duportail helped assemble a set of portable 
bridges, design the fortress at West Point, and establish three companies of combat engineers to train 
Americans. See id; Robert K. Wright, Jr., “or Is Their Standing Army To Be Despised”: The 
Emergence of the Continental Army as a Military Institution, in ARMS AND INDEPENDENCE: THE 
MILITARY CHARACTER OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 50, 61–62 (Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert 
eds., 1984). 
63
  For example, he relied on the Prussian officer Friedrich Wilhelm Baron von Steuben to develop a 
system of drill regulations and tactics for his army. See Wright, supra note 62, at 69–70. Baron von 
Steuben personally trained a company of officers and dispatched them to transmit his ideas throughout 
the Continental Army. See WEIGLEY, supra note 37, at 64. He also established the office of inspector 
general, which strengthened Washington’s control of the army and “gradually eliminated the need for 
most existing administrative officials.” See Wright, supra note 62, at 71. 
64
  See Wright, supra note 62, at 72. 
65
  It may be helpful at this point to address an ambiguity in the term “standing army.” On one hand, 
“standing” implies permanent, as opposed to an army raised in the midst of war and then disbanded in 
times of peace. However, in eighteenth-century debates and correspondence, the term standing army did 
not always mean permanent. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress 
(Sept. 2, 1776), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 4, 5 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1932) 
(“[O]ur Liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded, If not entirely lost, If their defence is left to any 
but a permanent standing Army, I mean one to exist during the War.”). Instead, a standing army refers to 
an army of full-time professional soldiers, as opposed to a militia composed of volunteer citizens serving 
part-time. In this sense, a standing army is permanent because it serves for the duration of the war. As 
discussed above, the early manpower shortages of the Continental Army were caused in part by the need 
to reenlist soldiers every year. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. A standing army could 
solve this problem without necessarily continuing beyond the duration of the war. The distinction 
between a professional standing army, which included mercenaries, and a volunteer militia, which did 
not, informed the debate during the Revolutionary Era. 
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century England.66 Radical Whigs associated standing armies with 
mercenaries, which they in turn associated with the king’s arbitrary 
exercises of power.67 By contrast, they believed that a militia of citizen 
soldiers “stood at the heart of the stable and balanced constitution.”68 
Moderate Whigs, on the other hand, argued that standing armies were both 
necessary and compatible with the survival of a free society, as long as “the 
safety of the realm required it and Parliament consented.”69 Both of these 
visions found expression in the debates over standing armies in America 
before, during, and after the Revolution. 
In the years immediately preceding the Revolution, radical Whig 
rhetoric decrying the British army’s depravity in the colonies was an 
important part of the discourse driving America toward revolution.70 In the 
midst of the war, however, exigencies that required the skill of military 
professionals brought American views more in line with moderate Whig 
acceptance of standing armies,71 in part because the militia proved 
unreliable as the war progressed.72 In the battles of Long Island, Kip’s Bay, 
and White Plains during the summer and fall campaign of 1776, the militia 
“[threw] down its weapons and [ran] away in the face of the enemy.”73 
Washington’s frustration with the militia became apparent in a letter to the 
Continental Congress: 
 To place any dependance upon Militia, is, assuredly, resting upon a broken 
staff. Men just dragged from the tender Scenes of domestick life; 
unaccustomed to the din of Arms; totally unacquainted with every kind of 
Military skill, which being followed by a want of confidence in themselves, 
 
66
  See LAWRENCE DELBERT CRESS, CITIZENS IN ARMS: THE ARMY AND THE MILITIA IN AMERICAN 
SOCIETY TO THE WAR OF 1812, at 34 (1982) (“Certainly the competing English arguments over the 
nature of military institutions and their impact on civil society touched the consciousness of the 
colonists.”). Radical and moderate Whigs were two competing groups of political theorists in 
eighteenth-century England. See id. at 15–18. The radical Whigs considered themselves heirs to classical 
republican thought and developed a historical critique that purported to explain the decline of English 
liberty. See id. at 15–17. To the radical Whigs, the emergence of standing armies out of the old feudal 
order was a sign of society’s increasing decadence and corruption. Id. at 17. Moderate Whigs rejected 
the classical republican model and took a more positive view of historical progress. Id. at 15. In their 
view, military professionalism was just one manifestation of the specialization that was critical to the 
operation of modern society, and therefore acceptable. See id. at 15–16. 
67
  See id. at 18. 
68
  Id. at 16. 
69
  Id. at 25–26. 
70
  Id. at 53; E. Wayne Carp, The Problem of ational Defense in the Early American Republic, in 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: ITS CHARACTER AND LIMITS 14, 21 (Jack P. Greene ed., 1987) 
(“Americans’ denunciations of standing armies became commonplace after British regulars arrived in 
Boston in 1768.”). 
71
  See CRESS, supra note 66, at 53. 
72
  See Carp, supra note 70, at 24 (“The much vaunted militia, reputedly composed of virtuous 
farmers who fought selflessly for the commonwealth, evaporated in the face of prolonged conflict.”). 
73
  Id. 
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when opposed to Troops regularly train’d, disciplined, and appointed, superior 
in knowledge, and superior in Arms, makes them timid, and ready to fly from 
their own shadows. . . . 
 . . . . 
 The Jealousies of a standing Army, and the Evils to be apprehended from 
one, are remote; . . . but the consequence of wanting one . . . is certain, and 
inevitable Ruin . . . .74 
Largely as a result of Washington’s distrust of the militias, he built a 
standing army that included mercenaries.75 
The tension between the standing army’s utility and its potential to 
endanger liberty drove the postwar debate as well. During the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the ratification debates that 
followed, the Framers considered whether the new nation should rely 
primarily on militias or on a standing army for the national defense, and 
views differed on how each sort of military unit should be managed.76 
Opponents of the standing army, such as Eldridge Gerry and Luther Martin, 
feared that there would be no check on its power and proposed that 
restrictions be written into the Constitution to limit both the size of the army 
and the amount of revenue that Congress could appropriate to support it.77 
The Federalists, who favored the standing army, argued that such 
restrictions would be shortsighted because “[t]he circumstances that 
endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no 
constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the 
care of it is committed.”78 Echoing Washington’s concerns during the war, 
the Federalists also maintained that a militia would prove ineffective 
against a professional European army: “The steady operations of war 
against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted 
by a force of the same kind.”79 
Yet even the Federalist James Madison feared that a powerful standing 
army controlled by the Executive might endanger liberty. He argued in the 
Constitutional Convention debates that “[a] standing military force, with an 
overgrown Executive will not long be safe companions to liberty.”80 These 
fears were also repeatedly expressed by the Antifederalists, who revived 
 
74
  Letter from George Washington to the President of Congress (Sept. 24, 1776), in 6 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 65, at 106, 110, 112. 
75
  See supra Part I.B.2. 
76
  See Gary L. Hoffman, Court-Martial Jurisdiction and the Constitution: An Historical and 
Textual Analysis, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 43, 91–94 (1987). 
77
  Id. at 92. 
78
  THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, supra note 16, at 149 (Alexander Hamilton). 
79
  Id. NO. 25, at 162 (Alexander Hamilton). 
80
  James Madison, Friday June 29th in Convention, in 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787, at 461, 465 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).  
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radical Whig arguments against standing armies in the hands of an 
ambitious Executive and exalted state-controlled militias as “the bulwark of 
a free people.”81 
The Framers answered this problem by granting Congress broad 
powers over the military.82 The Federalists argued that frequent elections 
and the tension between opposing parties in Congress would keep the 
Legislative Branch responsive to public concerns over the danger of a large 
standing army. Hamilton explained: 
As often as the question comes forward, the public attention will be roused and 
attracted to the subject, by the party in opposition . . . . 
 Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community require time to 
mature them for execution. An army, so large as seriously to menace those 
liberties, could only be formed by progressive augmentations; which would 
suppose not merely a temporary combination between the legislature and 
executive, but a continued conspiracy for a series of time. Is it probable that 
such a combination would exist at all? Is it probable that it would be 
persevered in, and transmitted along through all the successive variations in a 
representative body, which biennial elections would naturally produce in both 
houses? . . . If such presumptions can fairly be made, there ought to be at once 
an end of all delegated authority.83 
Thus, the acceptance of a standing army in the new constitutional system 
depended on legislative control. 
Considering that mercenaries figure prominently in the Declaration of 
Independence, it is perhaps curious that the debates over standing armies in 
the Constitutional Convention do not specifically mention them. Perhaps 
the Framers, who constantly used the word “mercenary” in its derogatory 
sense in their political rhetoric against the British,84 did not want the word 
associated with their own military institutions. Yet there can be little doubt 
that at the time of this debate, they understood mercenaries to be part of a 
standing army. Besides the fact that both sides used mercenaries during the 
war, the association between mercenaries and standing armies was 
prevalent in the political debates taking place outside of the convention. 
 
81
  Weatherup, supra note 46, at 986 (quoting Letter from John De Witt to the Free Citizens of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, AM. HERALD (Boston), Dec. 3, 1787); accord Speeches of Patrick 
Henry (June 5 and 7, 1788), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS 199, 214 (Ralph Ketcham, ed. 2003) 
(“The army will salute him Monarch; your militia will leave you and assist in making him King, and 
fight against you: And what have you to oppose this force?”). 
82
  THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, supra note 16, at 166 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[W]hen they referred the 
exercise of that power [over the military] to the judgment of the legislature, they had arrived at the 
ultimate point of precaution which was reconcilable with the safety of the community.”). 
83
  Id. at 167–68. 
84
  For instance, in General Orders dated January 1, 1777, George Washington wrote, “[I]t is 
expected that humanity and tenderness to women and children will distinguish brave Americans, 
contending for liberty, from infamous mercenary ravagers, whether British or Hessians.” THE WRITINGS 
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 65, at 466. 
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Speakers at the time seemed to treat “mercenary” and “standing army” 
as interchangeable terms; at the very least, they presumed the inclusion of 
mercenaries in the term “standing army.” In a pre-Revolution town hall 
meeting in Boston, for example, one citizen who protested the quartering of 
soldiers explicitly equated standing armies with mercenaries and opposed 
them to the ideal of citizen militias: “Standing Armies have forever made 
Shipwreck of Free States and no People Jealous of their liberties ever 
patiently suffered Mercenary Troops to be quarter’d & maintained within 
their Populous Cities; the Militia of the Colony are its best and natural 
defense[.]”85 Similarly, the Virginia Convention drafted a resolution stating 
that “a Militia in this Colony would for ever render it unnecessary for the 
Mother Country to keep among us, for the purpose of our defence, any 
Standing Army of mercenary forces, always subversive of the quiet, and 
dangerous to the liberties of the people.”86 The pseudonymous writer 
Caractacus, in the pamphlet On Standing Armies, referred to standing 
armies as mercenaries even while acknowledging that they were necessary 
under certain circumstances: 
I shall only mention one political evil to which there is too great a propensity 
in the American Colonies, and that is, a willingness to trust the defence of our 
country to mercenary troops. I would not be understood here to insinuate the 
least reflection upon our brave countrymen who are now encamped around 
Boston: a mercenary army was absolutely necessary in that place, as the militia 
of that country were unequal to the toil and expense of besieging and watching 
the motions of our enemies.87 
Mercenaries’ ubiquity in armies during the American Revolution, as 
well as their prevalence as a topic of political debate, demonstrates that the 
Framers and other well-informed citizens at the time understood that 
standing armies were not limited to enlisted citizens. The fact that the 
Framers nevertheless provided for the limited use of a standing army in the 
Constitution shows that they accepted that the nation’s military resources 
could include military professionals other than the citizen soldier. However, 
they were only willing to make this provision on the condition that 
Congress have broad power over the military. The next section examines 
the extent of Congress’s power over the armed forces. 
 
85
  A REPORT OF THE RECORD COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF BOSTON CONTAINING THE BOSTON 
TOWN RECORDS, 1770 THROUGH 1777, at 133 (Boston, Rockwell & Churchill 1887).  
86
  Petition and Memorial of the Assembly of Jamaica (Mar. 23, 1775), in 2 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, 
FOURTH SERIES 167 (Peter Force ed., Washington, D.C. 1837), available at http://lincoln.lib.niu.edu/cgi-
bin/amarch/getdoc.pl?/var/lib/philologic/databases/amarch/.2178. 
87
  Caractatus On Standing Armies (Aug. 21, 1775), in 3 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, FOURTH SERIES 219 
(Peter Force ed., Washington, D.C. 1837), available at http://lincoln.lib.niu.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/
getobject.pl?c.6216:1.amarch.  
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D. Congress’s Authority over the Armed Forces 
The Constitution’s provisions for a standing army reflect a compromise 
between radical Whig idealism and moderate Whig pragmatism.88 The 
Founders’ fear of a standing army, like that of the English theorists a 
century earlier,89 was rooted in the danger that such an army would pose in 
the hands of an unchecked Executive.90 The solution was to divide power 
over the standing army between the Executive and the Legislature.91 The 
Constitution granted Congress the power to “raise and support Armies” and 
“[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval 
Forces,” but limited that power by requiring that “no Appropriation of 
Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years.”92 With this 
authority, Congress can “check any propensity of the President for self-
aggrandizement and tyranny” by preventing “the establishment or 
continuation of a [permanent] standing army in times of peace.”93 
These provisions amount to a very broad grant of power to Congress. 
No restrictions other than the two-year limit on appropriations bind that 
body’s ability to raise armies.94 Congress is not limited to raising an army in 
times of war, as some in the Constitutional debates proposed,95 but may do 
so in times of peace in order to be prepared for the eventuality of war.96 
Furthermore, the language makes it clear that Congress’s power to raise an 
army is exclusive.97 The Executive has no power to raise a private army or 
navy in the absence of congressional authorization.98 
Congress’s power to regulate the armed forces it raises is similarly 
extensive. It is empowered to impose rules on the internal governance of the 
 
88
  CRESS, supra note 66, at 53 (“Americans developed during the Revolutionary War a 
constitutional and institutional structure that reflected both a sensitivity to radical Whig suspicions of the 
military in society and a recognition that military expertise was essential for the preservation of 
republican institutions.”). 
89
  See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text. 
90
  See David I. Lewittes, Constitutional Separation of War Powers: Protecting Public and Private 
Liberty, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1083, 1136 (1992). 
91
  See id. at 1137. 
92
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 14. 
93
  Lewittes, supra note 90, at 1137–38; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, supra note 16, at 167 
(Alexander Hamilton) (“[Legislatures] are not at liberty to vest in the executive department permanent 
funds for the support of an army, if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so 
improper a confidence.”). 
94
  Lewittes, supra note 90, at 1143. 
95
  See Hoffman, supra note 76, at 92. 
96
  See Lewittes, supra note 90, at 1142; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, supra note 16, at 161 
(Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that prohibiting the raising of a standing army in times of peace would 
create “a nation incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare for defense before it was actually invaded.”). 
97
  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 24, supra note 16, at 154 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he whole power 
of raising armies was lodged in the legislature, not in the executive . . . .”). 
98
  See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Separation and Overlap of War and Military 
Powers, 87 TEX. L. REV. 299, 324 (2008). 
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military and on the structure of chains of command by legislating 
hierarchical promotional guidelines and organizing units around civilian 
and military leaders whose appointments require Senate confirmation.99 The 
first Congress enacted rules covering “training and tactics, the positioning 
of assets, the use of military force, and the treatment of prisoners”100 
Congress alone has the power to create a separate system of military 
justice,101 which includes setting disciplinary guidelines and authorizing 
penalties for violations.102 Finally, Congress has extensive oversight 
functions: it subjects military policy to scrutiny and accountability by 
requiring written reports and holding oversight hearings.103 
Despite the vast potential for Congress to exercise dominion over the 
United States’ standing army, it has not exercised its authority over the 
armed forces to control PMFs operating with the U.S. military in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.104 The remainder of this Comment examines the use of PMFs 
today and argues that Congress must regulate them as part of the military. 
II. THE MODERN PRIVATE MILITARY FIRM 
A. Role in Contemporary American Foreign Policy 
If mercenaries were the norm during the American Revolution, why 
does the use of PMFs today generate such heated debate? Two explanations 
seem likely. First, there was a global change in norms: mercenaries became 
less acceptable after the Thirty Years’ War and were generally entirely 
eliminated from national armies after the Franco–Prussian War ended in 
1871.105 Thus, mercenaries have been generally unacceptable for over a 
century, and the recent emergence of PMFs challenges a prevailing 
international norm.106 Second, for most of its history, the United States was 
 
99
  See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic 
Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1001, 1055–56 (2004). 
100
  Prakash, supra note 98, at 332–33; see also Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 4, 1 Stat. 95, 96. 
101
  Prakash, supra note 98, at 329. 
102
  See, e.g., Resolution of November 28, 1775, in 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 
1774–1789, at 378, 381 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1905) (prohibiting desertion and the 
destruction of enemy papers). 
103
  See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 99, at 1065–66. For a sense of the scale of congressional military 
oversight activity in modern times, see Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of 
Civilian Control of the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 379 (1994) (“Congress annually 
makes 750,000 inquiries of the Pentagon and demands 750 yearly reports. Furthermore, the Congress 
created potent support agencies like the General Accounting Office (GAO), a huge 5,000 person 
investigatory organization that frequently targets the military.” (footnote omitted)). 
104
  See infra Part II.C.1. 
105
  See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
106
  See PERCY, supra note 12, at 121–22, 216–17 (explaining the shift away from mercenary use in 
the 19th century as a change in norms and discussing the criticism of PMFs in the context of the 
international norm against mercenaries). 
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not in a state of permanent military mobilization around the globe as it has 
been since World War II.107 Professional military companies became 
necessary only as U.S. military power expanded beyond the capacity of an 
all-volunteer army.108 Seen in that context, the controversy over PMFs arises 
out of a larger debate over the proper role of American military power and 
its relationship to democratic institutions.109 
The aftermath of the Cold War created the conditions necessary for the 
reemergence of military privatization.110 The downsizing of major military 
efforts at the end of the Cold War created a global surplus of individuals 
with military training. Those individuals marketed their services to 
governments around the world that were hoping to save costs and improve 
the efficiency of their defense programs.111 In the United States, the trend of 
military privatization began under the administrations of George H.W. Bush 
and Bill Clinton, both of whom embraced it as a means of scaling back the 
military at the end of the Cold War.112 
Privatization escalated dramatically after 9/11.113 Even before the 
regular military arrived, private contractors accompanied the special forces 
that hit the ground first in Afghanistan.114 Before the war in Iraq started, the 
Army announced that it would permit contractors to compete for 154,910 
civilian jobs and 58,727 military positions, including interrogators, guards 
for U.S. military bases, and other functions traditionally performed 
exclusively by enlisted military personnel.115 PMFs became the second-
largest military force in Iraq after the U.S. military.116 
Currently, the Executive Branch manages PMFs through contractual 
relationships.117 Within the Department of Defense (DOD), “the office of 
the Assistant Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Program Support) is 
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  See generally Christopher A. Preble, The Founders, Executive Power, and Military Intervention, 
30 PACE L. REV. 688 (2010) (describing the transition from limited military engagements in the United 
States’ first century to the permanent military institution of today). 
108
  See infra notes 125–28 and accompanying text. 
109
  See infra note 128. 
110
  Minow, supra note 6, at 997. 
111
  See id. 
112
  See id. at 1001–03 (“The Pentagon delivered $300 billion worth of contracts to private military 
industries between 1992 and 2002.”). 
113
  Rebecca Ulam Weiner, Sheep in Wolves’ Clothing, LEGAL AFF., Jan./Feb. 2006, at 23, 23, 
available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2006/argument_weiner_janfeb06.msp 
(“In the Persian Gulf war of 1991, the ratio of soldiers to contractors was 50 to 1. In the current Iraqi 
conflict, it is 10 to 1 and falling.”). 
114
  See Minow, supra note 6, at 1003. 
115
  See id. 
116
  See id. at 996. 
117
  See JENNIFER K. ELSEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32419, PRIVATE SECURITY 
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: BACKGROUND, LEGAL STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES 6 (2008). 
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responsible for all contractor oversight . . . .”118 In some cases, contracts are 
routed through the Commerce, Interior, or State Departments and are 
managed independently by officials in those departments.119 
One military officer’s rationale for privatization echoes the same 
concerns that led military commanders in the American Revolution to seek 
help from military professionals: “When you run out of soldiers and they 
don’t have an expertise, one way to get that capability on the battlefield is 
to contract it.”120 It is certainly true that PMFs provide significant benefits to 
the military. They offer a “surge capability” in situations where it would be 
ineffective to expand the military to meet “extraordinary but time-limited 
need[s].”121 Contractors also often have technological expertise that the 
government cannot quickly duplicate, such as expertise in the operation of 
complex weapons systems.122 By employing contractors, “the military can 
obtain the newest technology and the staffs trained to maintain it—and even 
avoid the costs of retraining simply by shifting to a new team.”123 In 
conflicts such as the one in Iraq, where contractors often employ locals, 
privatization also provides a cultural and linguistic advantage.124 
In fact, it simply might not be possible to implement the current 
foreign policy of the United States without contractors.125 Maintaining a 
network of over 700 military bases around the globe126 and a long-term 
occupation of two countries is very likely beyond the capacity of an all-
volunteer army.127 Private contractors will probably remain a part of the 
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  Id. 
119
  Michaels, supra note 99, at 1067. 
120
  Minow, supra note 6, at 1003 (quoting Major Gary Tallman, an Army spokesman) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
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  ELSEA ET AL., supra note 117, at 35. 
122
  Scott M. Sullivan, Private Force/Public Goods, 42 CONN. L. REV. 853, 881–82 (2010). For 
instance, the military often hires contractors to operate complex weapons systems. Id. 
123
  Minow, supra note 6, at 1004. 
124
  ELSEA ET AL., supra note 117, at 36. 
125
  Id. (“Without private contractors, the U.S. military would not have sufficient capabilities to carry 
out an operation of the scale of Iraq, according to many analysts.”); see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO–03–695, MILITARY OPERATIONS: CONTRACTORS PROVIDE VITAL 
SERVICES TO DEPLOYED FORCES BUT ARE NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED IN DOD PLANS 2 (2003) 
(“DOD uses contractors to provide U.S. forces that are deployed overseas with a wide variety of services 
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  CHALMERS JOHNSON, NEMESIS: THE LAST DAYS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 5 (2006) (“[W]e 
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military bases spread around . . . more than 130 countries . . . .”). 
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  See Kateryna L. Rakowsky, Note, Military Contractors and Civil Liability: Use of the 
Government Contractor Defense to Escape Allegations of Misconduct in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2 STAN. 
J. C.R. & C.L. 365, 370 (2006) (“Experts widely recognize that ‘without contractors, our military simply 
cannot project its awesome technical superiority abroad.’” (quoting Steven L. Schooner, Contractor 
Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 
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American military absent a wholesale change in the way the nation 
organizes and uses its armed forces.128 
B. ot Quite Civilians, ot Quite Soldiers129 
Throughout the Cold War and its aftermath, the military maintained a 
distinction between civilian contractors and enlisted soldiers by separating 
the types of work they performed.130 In contemporary military conflicts such 
as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, the line separating civilian 
contractor work from military work has essentially disappeared.131 Until 
recently, the concept of “inherently governmental functions” defined those 
governmental activities that could not be privatized.132 Congress codified 
this concept in the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 as a 
“function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to require 
performance by Federal Government employees.”133 In the military context, 
combat is the paradigmatic “inherently governmental” function from which 
contractors have been excluded.134 
However, the PMFs and the government have not adhered to this rule 
in practice. PMF employees in Iraq and Afghanistan have repeatedly 
engaged in combat. On March 31, 2004, four employees of the PMF 
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Blackwater were attacked while guarding a convoy in Fallujah.135 Just a 
week later, when Iraqi militia forces attacked U.S. headquarters in Najaf, 
eight Blackwater employees held them off, and Blackwater sent in its own 
helicopters as backup.136 
PMFs’ combat activities are not limited to defensive or protective 
services.137 In May 2004, employees of DynCorp helped raid Ahmed 
Chalabi’s personal compound as well as his offices at the Iraqi National 
Congress in Baghdad.138 The following September, federal agents 
investigated Blackwater for the apparently unprovoked killing of seventeen 
civilians in Nisour Square, Baghdad.139 
Rather than drawing a clear distinction between contractors and the 
military based on roles in combat, the Executive Branch has responded to 
situations like those described above by blurring the line further.140 
Contractors are now allowed to “use deadly force when such force 
reasonably appears necessary to execute their security mission”141 
Furthermore, courts have begun extending immunity from civil suit to 
contractors in recognition of the role they play in combat.142 For example, 
the Government Contractor Defense (GCD) is a judicially created 
affirmative defense that applies certain provisions of the Federal Tort 
Claims Act to military contractors.143 Since the 1980s, it has protected 
contractors involved in the manufacture or design of military equipment 
from product liability suits under certain circumstances.144 Recent litigation 
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has expanded this doctrine to cover contractors who take part in combat.145 
In Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., the court decided the GCD would shield the 
defendants if they “were essentially soldiers in all but name.”146 Thus, the 
law now recognizes that, in some cases, no real distinction exists between 
the role of the military and its contractors. 
The methods of modern warfare muddy the distinction between PMFs 
and the military even further.147 Weapons technology has stretched the 
modern battlefield to proportions unimaginable a century ago.148 A soldier 
sitting in front of a computer screen far removed from the point of conflict 
can fire a missile at enemies thousands of miles away.149 Very often, civilian 
contractors maintain and operate these remote weapons systems.150 When 
battles are fought with such complex technological systems, the law of war 
does not provide a clear definition of what constitutes direct participation in 
combat.151 
Thus, in practice, the distinction between the military and the PMFs 
they hire has collapsed. This is not simply a result of the particular roles 
PMFs play in combat but also a function of contractors’ ubiquity. They 
have assumed such a broad range of roles that the U.S. military would have 
a hard time functioning without them.152 Contractors work in war zones as 
“communication specialists, intelligence operatives, target selectors, 
surveillance pilots, armed security and peacekeeping agents, hostage 
rescuers, interrogators, and weapon systems operators.”153 They serve as 
strategic planners and military advisors in the field and in the Pentagon, and 
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as Reserve Officers’ Training Corps instructors across the United States.154 
In some cases, companies are tied so closely to Pentagon operations that 
they essentially assign contracts to themselves.155 For example, KBR won 
its Iraq contract based on its ability to meet the U.S. Army’s contingency 
plan for rebuilding Iraq, a plan KBR itself prepared as part of an earlier 
contract.156 One commentator noted that contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan 
do “‘what citizens consider the stuff of government: planning, policy 
writing, budgeting, intelligence gathering, nation building,’ but under the 
employment relationship of a temporary worker.”157 
In sum, modern PMFs are full-scale military companies that have been 
functionally integrated into the U.S. Armed Forces. As such, they are 
precisely analogous to the private military companies operating in Europe 
and America at the time of the American Revolution and the centuries 
preceding it.158 Like Washington’s foreign corps of engineers, they provide 
expertise and logistical support that allow the military to take advantage of 
the latest technology. Like Prussian officer Baron von Stueban,159 they help 
develop and implement military policy. Like Pulaski’s Legion,160 they put 
soldiers in the field. 
As shown in Part I, the Framers understood standing armies to include 
a broad range of military professionals beyond the enlisted citizen. The 
Framers nevertheless agreed to provide for a standing army for the nation’s 
defense, but only on the condition that it be regulated by Congress. This 
Part has shown thus far that modern PMFs are military professionals who 
are so closely integrated with the regular military that it would very likely 
be impossible to implement current U.S. defense policy without them. As 
such, they fit squarely within the Framers’ broad understanding of a 
standing army. Therefore, the regulation of PMFs is exclusively the 
province of Congress. Yet under the current system, executive departments 
assume control of PMFs and manage them through contractual relationships 
 
154
  Id. The head of DynCorp, one of the largest military companies in the United States, has 
claimed, “You could fight without us, but it would be difficult . . . . Because we’re so involved, it’s 
difficult to extricate us from the process.” Deven R. Desai, Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: A Proposal 
for a Layered Approach to Regulating Private Military Companies, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 825, 834 (2005) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
155
  See Desai, supra note 154, at 834. 
156
  Id. 
157
  Minow, supra note 6, at 1003–04 (footnote omitted) (quoting Dan Guttman, The Shadow 
Pentagon, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 24, 2004, 12:00 AM), http://www.iwatchnews.org/2004/09/
24/6623/shadow-pentagon). 
158
  See, e.g., Avant, supra note 13, at 20 (“Modern contractors most resemble the military 
enterprisers of the late Middle Ages.”); Milliard, supra note 12, at 8 (“[Modern private military 
companies’] corporate model can be traced to Harold Hardraade’s Norse mercenaries, first offered in 
support of the Byzantine Empire in 1032.”). 
159
  See supra note 63. 
160
  See supra note 54. 
106:317  (2012) “Jealousies of a Standing Army” 
 339
as civilians. This arrangement violates constitutional separation of powers 
by giving authority to the Executive that belongs to Congress. 
The remainder of this Part will examine some of the problems that 
have arisen under the current system. First it will look specifically at the 
systemic imbalances the current system creates in the constitutional scheme 
of separation of powers over the military. Next it will look at some of the 
practical problems of effective management that have arisen, including 
widespread waste and fraud, confusion in the chain of command, and a lack 
of accountability in the courts for crimes committed by PMFs. The systemic 
constitutional problems demonstrate why Congress must fulfill its proper 
role in regulating PMFs, while the practical problems suggest the shape that 
congressional regulation should take. Accordingly, Part III will suggest a 
proposal for reform. 
C. Flaws in the Current System 
The current system of regulating and managing PMFs is deeply flawed 
in three key areas. 
First, the system distorts the balance of power between Congress and 
the Executive because PMFs have become a substantial private military 
force entirely under the control of the Executive. Thus, although Congress’s 
authority over the armed forces was designed to serve as a check on 
executive power, the use of PMFs permits the Executive to exercise plenary 
power over a broad range of military operations. Second, the current system 
lacks sufficient oversight to ensure contractual compliance and to establish 
a clear chain of command on the battlefield. Third, the system lacks 
adequate accountability for criminal behavior by PMFs because their 
employees often do not fall under any court’s jurisdiction. 
1. PMFs and the Separation of Powers.—The current system of 
military contracting poses a threat to the system of checks and balances that 
the Framers carefully crafted to avoid vesting the Executive with excessive 
unilateral power over the military.161 As discussed earlier, the Framers were 
adamantly opposed to placing unchecked military power in the hands of the 
Executive.162 Therefore, the Constitution unambiguously separated 
command of the military163 from regulation of the military164 in order to 
prevent a tyrannical aggrandizement of executive war powers.165 Military 
contracting subverts Congress’s regulation of the military in numerous 
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ways, which in turn prevents Congress from acting as a check on executive 
power. 
Congress can constrain a hawkish president by limiting the number of 
troops available to him. But by providing an external, elastic source of 
troops, PMFs allow the Executive to exercise military power where 
congressional opposition would otherwise prevent it.166 During the Balkan 
conflict in the 1990s, for example, the Clinton Administration wanted to 
provide military support to the Croats (and later the Bosnian Muslims) to 
counter Serbian aggression.167 Committing American troops was not 
possible, however, in the face of congressional opposition (as well as 
numerous other obstacles, including an U.N. arms embargo and hesitant 
international allies).168 Clinton therefore turned to PMFs to accomplish his 
goals without the political opposition he would have faced had he sent 
American troops.169 This situation shows how PMFs provide the Executive 
with an independent source of military power that allows him to circumvent 
the check of congressional authority over the armed forces. 
Congress’s power of the purse—another tool it can use to constrain the 
use of the military—can also be circumvented through creative funding for 
military contracts.170 In Iraq, for example, contractors were paid, in part, 
directly from revenue generated by Iraqi oil sales rather than from revenue 
from the U.S. federal budget.171 Under these circumstances, Congress’s 
ability to influence military policy through funding is nonexistent. 
Contractors bypass congressional control in other ways as well. For 
example, while Congress traditionally exercises influence through Senate 
confirmation of military officers, the use of contractors nullifies the 
Senate’s role in deciding who will implement military policy.172 And 
contracting limits Congress’s role in authorizing the use of force: because 
the War Powers Resolution applies only to the deployment of U.S. Armed 
Forces and anti-covert operations legislation requiring congressional 
notification and consultation applies only to U.S. intelligence officers,173 the 
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A fundamental problem underlying Congress’s failure to regulate 
PMFs is the extent to which PMFs and the Executive have successfully 
avoided sharing information with Congress. As noted earlier, Congress 
scrutinizes military policy by demanding written reports and holding 
oversight hearings.175 However, PMFs routinely resist congressional 
inquiries by claiming the need to protect proprietary information.176 
Additionally, the Executive has often failed to keep sufficient records or has 
simply refused to present basic, accurate information.177 The Executive also 
evades congressional scrutiny of PMFs by arranging for the companies to 
contract directly with third-party nations or host countries.178 Congress’s 
failure to gather information about PMFs means that very basic questions—
such as how many contractors are currently employed, exactly which 
companies are involved, and how much taxpayers spend for their services—
remain unanswered.179 Without such information, Congress cannot possibly 
regulate PMFs effectively. 
A crucial unanswered question is why Congress has failed to insist that 
PMFs and the Executive share information. It seems that Congress simply 
lacks the political will to address the issue. This brings the discussion back 
to a much broader point made earlier180: Congress bears the responsibility to 
protect and maintain its institutional role in the constitutional system of 
separation of powers. In other words, if it is a violation of separation of 
powers that the Executive currently controls PMFs, then Congress 
ultimately bears the responsibility for not asserting control. 
Congress’s failure to assume control of PMFs has consequences for the 
democratic decisionmaking process. As Hamilton explained in Federalist 
No. 26, Congress acts as a check on executive exercise of military power 
largely because it was designed to be more responsive to the will of the 
electorate.181 When the President uses PMFs to enable military engagements 
without the knowledge or consent of Congress, it is impossible for 
congressional leaders to represent their constituencies on the issue. The 
electorate tends to be very sensitive to American casualties, for example.182 
This is unsurprising, as the burden of military engagement falls primarily 
on the American public, not their elected officials.183 Contractor 
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deployments are not counted among official troop levels, however, and 
contractor deaths are not counted among official casualties.184 In this way, 
the true costs of war in blood and treasure remain hidden from public view. 
2. Lack of Oversight.—Turning now from systemic constitutional 
problems to more practical problems of effective management, it is clear 
that there are serious flaws in the oversight of PMF operations. In other 
words, not only is the Executive doing Congress’s job, it is doing the job 
incompetently. Oversight of PMFs in Iraq and Afghanistan is grossly 
deficient in two key respects: contractual compliance and chain of 
command in the field. 
Numerous reports have found that failures of contractual compliance 
enforcement are “pervasive and basic.”185 A 2004 report from the Office of 
the Inspector General on coalition contracts in Iraq found missing and 
incomplete records, as well as an inadequate system for contract review, 
tracking, and monitoring.186 In many instances, as a result of an insufficient 
number of adequately trained staff,187 the contracting department had no 
representative on site where the contractor was operating.188 
Further complicating the problem, the DOD often hires private 
companies to monitor other companies’ contracts.189 For example, Aegis, a 
private security company, serves as a “coordinating hub” for more than fifty 
private security companies in Iraq and oversees a $293 million contract.190 
In other cases, there are layers of subcontracting that obscure oversight.191 
The failure to enforce contractual compliance contributes to 
widespread waste, fraud, and abuse because the government cannot hold 
contractors accountable for mistakes and overbilling if it lacks basic 
information.192 A 2003 GAO report found that there had been $49 billion in 
errors by the DOD’s billing agency in the previous year, which cost $34 
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million to correct.193 In another instance, a Halliburton employee testified 
that when the company subcontracted jobs to companies who in turn 
subcontracted, “[w]e, essentially, lost control of the project and paid 
between four to nine times what we needed to fund that project.”194 Despite 
these types of problems, the government has rarely suspended or otherwise 
disciplined contractors for misconduct, overcharging, and other 
violations.195 
A second oversight problem arises when military commanders lack a 
command-and-control relationship with contractors.196 A GAO official 
testified before Congress in 2006 that private security contractors did not 
coordinate with the military when they entered the “battle space” in Iraq.197 
As a result, it is often unclear how military commanders should “secure 
cooperation from contractors to promote order in the theater of 
operations.”198 At the Abu Ghraib prison, for example, military personnel 
did not receive guidance about how to use contracted personnel and did not 
receive information about the terms and procedures specified in the 
contract.199 Several people reported situations in which contractors held 
authority over military personnel.200 As a result, there was confusion 
regarding “the appropriate relationship between contractor personnel, 
government civilian employees, and military personnel.”201 
This confusion raises a serious concern. Without a clear chain of 
command, contractors may fail to do their jobs at critical moments, 
endangering lives and thwarting American objectives.202 This problem 
existed even in those decades when contractors provided purely commercial 
or ministerial, as opposed to military, services.203 In 1976, during an 
outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, DOD contractors left en 
masse and the military officers could not order them to stay.204 Desertion 
creates an even greater risk now that contractors are indispensable to the 
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execution of combat operations. As Colonel Steven Zamparelli, the Director 
of Contracting for the Air Force, has pointed out, “[T]oday, [such a 
desertion during battle] could mean the only people a field commander has 
to accomplish a critical ‘core competency’ task such as weapons-system 
maintenance . . . have left and gone home.”205 
3. Lack of Accountability.—A second important set of practical 
problems that has arisen in the current system of military contracting is a 
lack of accountability for criminal behavior. PMF employees often escape 
prosecution for criminal behavior in the war zones where they operate.206 
Until recently, civilian military contractors could not be held accountable 
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)207—the legal code 
governing members of the U.S. Armed Forces—unless Congress had 
formally declared war.208 
Prosecuting PMF employees as civilians in federal criminal courts, 
however, has proven problematic. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Act (MEJA) extends federal jurisdiction over persons employed by or 
accompanying the Armed Forces who engage in criminal conduct outside 
of the United States.209 But several significant jurisdictional gaps remain.210 
MEJA does not “cover non-felony offenses or offenses punishable by one 
year or less; it only applies to those persons ‘supporting the mission of the 
DOD’”—which means that contractors working on missions for other 
agencies may fall outside of the scope of the Act—and it does not extend to 
contractors working for the United States but paid through third-party 
countries.211 Separately, federal courts could have jurisdiction over PMFs in 
Iraq and Afghanistan through the War Crimes Act of 1996 (WCA).212 But 
that statute is limited to “grave breach[es]” of the Geneva Conventions and 
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its protocols,213 and to date no civilian contractor has been indicted under 
the WCA.214 
Further complicating the picture, if a private litigant managed to 
establish jurisdiction in a federal civil court and get past the Government 
Contractor Defense, many PMFs would still avoid accountability through 
indemnification clauses in their contracts.215 A recent congressional inquiry 
uncovered over 120 military contracts that included indemnity clauses 
requiring the U.S. government to cover any liability incurred by PMFs 
during performance of the contract.216 The taxpayer, therefore, would foot 
the bill in many cases even if a PMF faced an adverse judgment. 
Efforts to prosecute PMF employees often fare no better in foreign 
jurisdictions. For example, the Coalition Provisional Authority, the interim 
government that the United States established in Baghdad after invading 
Iraq, issued an order shielding both U.S. forces and civilian contractors 
from the jurisdiction of Iraqi national courts.217 Application of international 
law is also prohibitively difficult. Although PMFs could conceivably be 
prosecuted and otherwise regulated under treaties prohibiting mercenary 
activity,218 the only broadly accepted definition of an illegal mercenary—the 
one contained in the 1977 revision of Protocol I of the Geneva 
Convention219—is construed so narrowly that most commentators have 
concluded that it does not apply to PMFs.220 The prospect that new 
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international law might be adopted to impose limitations on PMFs appears 
unlikely.221 For example, the most recent attempt to revise the Protocol I 
definition of mercenary is the International Convention Against the 
Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries,222 but no 
member of the European Union or the G8 has ratified it.223 
A lack of accountability for PMFs in the judicial system means that a 
number of crimes, including horrific human rights abuses, have gone 
unpunished. Perhaps most notorious are the incidents of prisoner abuse at 
Abu Ghraib prison—which were perpetrated in part by employees of CACI 
International—and the sex slave ring operated by employees of DynCorp in 
Bosnia.224 In neither case did the contractors face any criminal charges in 
either military or civilian courts.225 More recently, the Department of Justice 
has seen its efforts to prosecute Blackwater employees for murder, 
manslaughter, and weapons charges in federal courts fall apart under the 
combined pressure of immunity deals and jurisdictional complications.226 
Thus, PMFs often operate on a legal fault line that exists between the 
various court systems that might hold them accountable. This situation has 
left PMFs free in many cases to operate without the threat of legal 
accountability. 
As this Part demonstrates, the current system of regulating PMFs has 
failed. Leaving PMFs in the Executive’s control violates separation of 
powers and distorts the democratic decisionmaking process. Fundamental 
flaws of oversight and accountability result in vast wasted resources, 
confusion in the chain of command, and a failure to punish serious crimes. 
Part IV suggests legislation by which Congress could assume control of 
PMFs and address these problems. 
III. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
Congress could effectively regulate PMFs by applying aspects of the 
existing system of military regulation. Effective regulation would have 
three major components. First, in the field, PMFs would be subject to the 
military chain of command. Integrating contractors into a clear command 
structure would address the operational problems caused when lines of 
authority are unclear between military officers and contractors who are on 
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the same mission.227 It would also impose consequences on essential 
contractors if they were to abandon their duties in the course of an 
operation. 
Second, PMFs should be subject to courts-martial jurisdiction under 
the UCMJ. As the recent failure of prosecutions of Blackwater employees 
in federal courts shows, the difficulties of prosecuting PMFs as civilians 
may be insurmountable.228 Military courts, on the other hand, are 
specifically designed to deal with the contingencies of prosecuting crimes 
in the context of military activity.229 
As noted above, Congress has already largely addressed this issue.230 
Before 2006, civilians accompanying the military in a war zone could face 
courts-martial jurisdiction only during a formally declared war. A 2006 
amendment to the UCMJ extended the scope of courts-martial jurisdiction 
over civilians “serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field” 
beyond formal declarations of war to a “declared war or a contingency 
operation.”231 On March 27, 2008, Alaa Mohammad Ali became the first 
civilian contractor prosecuted in military court under the new law.232 Since 
then, prosecutors have filed charges in military court against two more 
civilian contractors.233 All three contractors have challenged the 
constitutionality of the 2006 amendment.234 At the time of this writing, the 
issue remains pending. 
Whether the 2006 amendment is ultimately effective depends on 
whether courts accept its constitutionality.235 A decision in favor of 
broadened jurisdiction for courts martial would not be unprecedented. In 
1956 in United States v. Burney, the Court of Military Appeals reasoned 
that civilians accompanying the military should be subject to courts-martial 
jurisdiction when they “receive benefits and protection from the military 
arm while performing their tasks, and their efforts are essential to the 
accomplishment of the military mission. The security of the nation may 
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depend on their activities, and they should answer to their immediate 
protector for any transgressions.”236 
Thus, the Burney court recognized that extending courts-martial 
jurisdiction over civilians whose duties were essential to the success of the 
military was crucial for the proper functioning of the armed forces. That 
rationale is even more persuasive today, given how much more prevalent 
contractors have become in the military. However, the Burney court’s 
application of courts-martial jurisdiction to civilians outside of declared 
wars was foreclosed in 1970 in United States v. Avrette.237 That case 
overturned a great deal of precedent and read the phrase “in time of war” to 
limit courts-martial jurisdiction over citizens to actions stemming from 
formally declared wars.238 Courts should uphold the 2006 amendment on the 
basis of the Burney rationale, particularly given that PMFs and the military 
are so closely integrated today that they are functionally indistinguishable. 
Finally, Congress should insist on access to full information about 
PMFs. While enforcing compliance from the Executive may prove difficult, 
Congress could use its power of the purse to attach conditions to funds used 
for private contracts. For example, they could refuse funding for companies 
that wish to withhold proprietary information. Congress has begun to take 
steps in this direction as well, though not nearly to the extent necessary. The 
War Funding Accountability Act, for example, would require the President 
to submit a report to Congress “in the case of a contract entered into by the 
United States relating to military operations in Iraq or the reconstruction of 
Iraq” providing “the name of the contractor and a description of the process 
by which the contract was awarded; the amount of the contract; and the date 
on which work under the contract is to begin.”239 The Stop Outsourcing 
Security Act would also impose stringent reporting requirements on the 
President as well as give congressional committees access to a copy of each 
contract issued in excess of $5 million.240 These bills would substantially 
improve Congress’s ability to exercise its oversight responsibilities over 
PMFs operating with the U.S. military, but to date, neither has passed.241 
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CONCLUSION 
Congress’s role in regulating the armed forces is fundamental to the 
constitutional system of separation of powers over military affairs. The 
history of mercenary use in standing armies during the era of the American 
Revolution shows that the Framers understood that the nation’s armed 
forces could comprise various types of military professionals other than 
enlisted citizens. They agreed to accept a standing army solely on the 
condition that it be regulated by Congress. 
Thus far, Congress has left PMFs almost entirely under the control of 
the Executive. Yet PMFs as they currently operate in contemporary military 
conflicts fall squarely within the Framers’ broad definition of a standing 
army. The regulation of PMFs is therefore a crucial part of the Congress’s 
authority over the military. By failing to assert control over PMFs, 
Congress is neglecting an important aspect of its institutional role. This 
situation has led to serious problems, both on a systemic level of 
constitutional governance and on a practical level of effective military 
management. If Congress continues to abdicate its responsibility in this 
matter, it will be creating precisely the type of situation that the Framers 
hoped to avoid when they debated how the new nation would secure its 
liberty without slipping into tyranny. 
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